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Transgenic Crops in the Age of Human Rights:
Moral Uncertainty and Rational Risk Policy
Jeffrey J. Mindrup
INTRODUCTION
History has proven it is characteristically human to modify the environment for some perceived benefit. Since the domestication of plants and
animals more than 10,000 years ago, humankind has manipulated plants to
improve yields and provide more food. This process evolved from breeding to crossbreeding and now to genetic engineering. In 1996, the first genetically modified crop available for commercial use reached the market. 1
In the ten years since, the use of genetically engineered or transgenic crops
has proliferated at impressive rates despite an ongoing debate about the ethical implications and possible consequences of genetically altered food.
Between 2003 and 2004, the use of transgenic crops worldwide increased
by 20% to a total of 200 million acres. 2 In 2004, 8.25 million farmers in 17
countries planted genetically altered crops, thereby joining a $4.7 billion
market. 3 The rate at which transgenic crops are overtaking traditional varieties is even more surprising. Between 1997 and 2002, the percentage of
soybeans that were Roundup Ready® soybeans, a transgenic variety, increased from 1.9% to 74% and transgenic cotton increased from just 4% in
1997 to 70% in 2002. 4 In addition to the proliferation of existing plants,
scientists are developing and testing new varieties with traits ranging from
pest and drought resistance to improved nutrition and taste. 5
Despite this growth, or perhaps because of it, the argument over transgenic crops has only intensified over the past ten years. At the same time,
transgenic crops are often absent from broader discussions of the ethical
propriety of genetic engineering. The genetic alteration of plants shares
many of the foundational issues that make ethical discussions of genetic
engineering of humans and other animals so difficult. Nevertheless, some
substantial differences and the unique history of transgenic crops provide a
1 CLIVE JAMES, PREVIEW: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2004, at
viii (ISAAA Briefs No. 32-2004), available at http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/publications/briefs/32/
download/isaaa-brief-32-2004.pdf.
2 Id. at iii.
3 Id. at iii, vii.
4 Michele C. Marra et al., The Payoffs to Transgenic Field Crops: An Assessment of the Evidence, 5 AGBIOFORUM 43, 43 (2002), available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v5n2/v5n2a02marra.pdf.
5 See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law
of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 810 (2001).
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unique opportunity to learn how to address the issues underlying the biotechnology debate. The importance of food has the public engaged—but
substantially fewer moral and religious objections to genetically altered
food remove some of the blinding passion that accompanies the idea of genetically altered animals and humans. The clear goals of using transgenic
crops to abate world hunger and the existing regulatory structure also provide a framework for discussing issues related to genetic engineering that is
absent when applying gene technology to animals or humans. As such, the
development of transgenic foods and the subsequent debate provide a
unique learning opportunity for effectively structuring the debate of these
difficult issues. Mistakes by advocates and opponents of transgenic crops
early in the discussion have polarized the arguments, obfuscated the public’s understanding of the issues, and foreclosed a productive discourse
about transgenic plants. By appreciating mistakes made in handling an issue that is less complex than those on the horizon, we can avoid the temptation to engage in empty rhetoric and properly weigh the benefits and risks
of genetic engineering.
DEVELOPMENT OF GENETIC ENGINEERING
At a point near the end of the last European Ice Age, humans began
domesticating and exploiting plants and animals. 6 Throughout the past ten
to fifteen thousand years, humanity has used the limits of available technology to manipulate plants to improve both the yield and the variety of the
food supply. 7 This activity took a great step forward in 1865 when Gregor
Mendel, a Moravian monk who had been experimenting with peas, published “Versuche über Pflanzen-Hybriden” (“Experiments with Plant Hybrids”). 8 By exposing the basic laws of heredity, Mendel’s work formed the
foundation for modern genetics. For over a hundred years, scientists, farmers, and even hobbyists applied Mendel’s lessons through traditional
breeding techniques to transfer genes between the same or closely related
species of plants and animals. 9 Then, in the mid-1970s, scientists discovered a process known as recombinant DNA technology, whereby scientists
remove discrete sections of a DNA molecule and replace them with others. 10 The emergence of this technology immediately touched off ethical
discussions in the scientific community. 11
6 PETER J. UCKO & G.W. DIMBLEBY, THE DOMESTICATION AND EXPLOITATION OF PLANTS AND
ANIMALS, at xvii (Aldine Publishing Co. 1968).
7 See id. at xvii–xx.
8 GREGOR MENDEL, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDISATION (Harv. Univ. Press 1965) (1866);
See also PETER PRINGLE, FOOD INC.: MENDEL TO MONSANTO—THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF THE
BIOTECH HARVEST 9 (Simon & Schuster 2003).
9 See Karen Charman, “Biotechnology Will Feed the World” and Other Myths, 6 PR WATCH
NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Madison, WI), Oct.–Dec. 1999, at 8, available at
http://www.prwatch.org/prwv6n4.pdf.
10 THOMAS A. SHANNON, MADE IN WHOSE IMAGE? GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 4 (Humanity Books 2000).
11 See LISA YOUNT, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 10 (Facts on File rev. ed.
2004).
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Though part of an ongoing scientific debate, genetic engineering took
a significant legal turn in 1980 in the seminal case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 12 In Chakrabarty, the United States Supreme Court observed that
the “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” were not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 13 because new plants and minerals are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.” 14 However, in a 5-4 decision, the Court determined a human-made,
genetically engineered bacterium was patentable as a new and useful
“manufacture or composition of matter.” 15 The Court stated Congress intended the statute to “include anything under the sun that is made by
man.” 16 In reaching its decision, the Court rejected arguments made in an
amicus brief filed by scientists and ethicists suggesting a “parade of horribles,” including the potential for pollution and disease as well as the loss
of biological diversity. 17 The Court reasoned any action it might take
would have little effect deterring the scientific mind and that such determinations of policy were for the legislative process. 18
HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As the Court noted, the decision in Chakrabarty did not spawn genetic
engineering, but it did dramatically affect the debate. Proponents of genetically modified organisms, which now included agribusiness interests, began to tout the potential for transgenic crops to end world hunger. The political environment was also ripe for transgenic crops. As part of a global
human rights movement, the United Nations declared in 1974, “[e]very
man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and
malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain his physical and mental
faculties.” 19 Ethicists concerned about human rights also targeted American foreign policy. Author Henry Shue argued that certain things were
“basic rights”—those goods that are necessary for the enjoyment of any
other rights. 20 Control of these goods, food being among the most obvious,
creates a duty not to deprive and a duty to aid the hungry. 21 Despite the focus on human rights, improvements in agriculture, and changes in the
world economy, the number of malnourished people around the world has
been consistently more than 800 million for decades. 22 Dramatic growth in
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id. at 309.
Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
Id.
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 317.
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 869 (Warren T. Reich et al. eds., Simon & Schuster MacMillan rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter BIOETHICS].
20 HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 22–29
(Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1996).
21 Id. at 55–60.
22 See, e.g., 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 869; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE
at 5 graph (2004), available at
OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2004,
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
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the world’s population and the depletion of natural resources raise serious
questions about the carrying capacity of the earth as we begin the twentyfirst century. 23 Biotechnology offers transgenic crops as a key component
in solving both the agricultural and environmental crises.
BENEFITS OF TRANSGENIC CROPS
The dire situation regarding world hunger and population growth provides proponents of biotechnology with their strongest argument. From the
beginning, transgenic crops have benefited from the clear goal of reducing
world hunger. Many scientists who have devoted their lives to improving
food and food production around the world argue that genetic engineering
is essential “to improve the quantity, quality, and availability of food.” 24
Proponents of biotechnology see agricultural improvements as indispensable to the ability to feed the 8.3 billion people anticipated in the next quarter century. 25 Transgenic crops offer increased yields, dependability, and
nutritional quality to food producers around the world. 26 Improvements in
food production could have beneficial effects on the environment as well.
Replacing traditional crops with transgenic varieties could allow farmers to
bring less land under cultivation, which would protect natural habitat and
actually preserve biodiversity. 27 Transgenic crops also offer the potential
to conserve environmental resources by reducing pesticide and herbicide
use as well as creating foods more fit to the local environment. 28 In this
way, transgenic crops become a win-win proposition—crops that produce
higher yields with less harm to the environment. In theory, and more recently in practice, scientists are able to tailor crops to a particular growing
environment or the nutritional needs of a particular population. Scientists
around the world have developed plants that “resist insects, disease,
drought, salt, and herbicides.” 29 The Third World is already benefiting
from the technology. Small-scale farmers in Africa, who desperately need
agricultural technology to improve food production in some of the most
acidic soil in the world, 30 benefit from transgenic seeds and crop protection
technologies targeted to local growing conditions and practices. 31 Given
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5650e/y5650e00.pdf.
23 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 870–71.
24 See Norman Borlaug, Letter to the Editor, Open Letter to the Editor, INDEPENDENT (London),
Apr. 20, 2000, reprinted in THE ETHICS OF FOOD: A READER FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 74, 77
(Gregory E. Pence ed., 2002) [hereinafter ETHICS OF FOOD].
25 See id. at 78.
26 Id. at 79.
27 Kurt Buechle, Note, The Great, Global Promise of Genetically Modified Organisms: Overcoming Fear, Misconceptions, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
283, 290 (2001).
28 SHANNON, supra note 10, at 13.
29 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 13.
30 Cornell University News Service, Crop Engineered to Grow in Poisonous Soil, SCIENCE
DAILY, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/08/070827153025.htm.
31 See Florence Wambugu, Why Africa Needs Agricultural Biotech, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 304, 305 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002) [hereinafter
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS].
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the disparities of world food distribution, it is disingenuous for privileged
societies to take an excessively cautious approach to genetically engineered
foods when the vast majority of humankind cannot afford that luxury. 32
To proponents, society reaps these benefits at little cost. Characterizing the process as an extension of traditional breeding practices, genetic
engineers find no moral objection to manipulating nature to develop transgenic crops. 33 In fact, some see genetic engineering as preferable because
it is more precise than traditional breeding methods. 34 While traditional
breeding transfers genes between organisms, genetic modification involves
moving only a single gene. 35 Thus, the ability arises to make beneficial
combinations that were impossible by traditional breeding. Genetic scientists then use these combinations to engineer products suited to the planting
conditions or nutritional needs of a certain area, thereby increasing food
production and nutrition in ways not possible without biotechnology. 36
While science must be respectful of natural processes and wary of hubris,
the reality of human expansion demands the increased production and nutrition biotechnology can provide.
OPPOSITION TO TRANSGENIC CROPS
Despite the admirable goals and potential benefits of transgenic crops,
biotechnology faces persistent opposition. The arguments against biotechnology generally take two forms: 1) moral or ethical objections to tampering with nature, and 2) a fear of unintended consequences, which tends to
focus on human health and the environment. For many reasons, the preliminary development of biotechnology did not involve a significant debate
about the wisdom of genetic engineering itself. First, there was little organized opposition to confront the rapidly developing technology. 37 Those
who held views that science should not meddle with nature were isolated
and were not organized. Next, as demonstrated by the Chakrabarty Court’s
treatment of ethical concerns, opponents had difficulty finding an audience
for vague moral arguments urging restraint. In contrast to the proponents
of genetic engineering who express clear goals of ending hunger, moral objections prove difficult to articulate. 38 The relation of genetic engineering
of crops and animals to traditional breeding and natural evolution also
muted many of the concerns that the public eventually developed in relation to genetic modification of human beings. At the time the first generation of modified crops were entering development, there was very little
Borlaug, supra note 24, at 77–78.
See J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology and
the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 106 (2000).
34 C. of Food, Agric., & Envtl. Sci., Ohio St. Univ., GMO: FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions),
http://web.archive.org/web/20020403135603/http://ohioline.osu.edu/gmo/faq.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2007) [hereinafter OSU GMO FAQ].
35 Id.
36 See SHANNON, supra note 10, at 13.
37 See Kunich, supra note 5, at 813–14.
38 See 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 932.
32
33
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emphasis on wrongness because there was, and continues to be, no general
concern for plant welfare. 39 Moreover, since humans had been breeding
plants and animals for much of history, opponents had the burden of showing how the use of the new technology was ethically suspect. 40 In time,
opponents have attempted to articulate a fundamental difference between
traditional breeding and the splicing of traits between species, but this distinction has not really appeared to take root with the public. 41
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE LACK OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTION
A dearth of religious objection to genetic engineering compounds the
difficulty of articulating a moral objection to genetically altered foods. In
fact, most religions find genetically modified organisms compatible with
their doctrine—even supporting biotechnology if used properly. 42 The issue then becomes not a question of if but a question of how. Much of the
religious acceptance of interventions in nature proceeds from the Bible. In
Genesis, God commands humanity to take dominion over the earth: “[F]ill
the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over
the birds of the air.” 43 Starting from this premise, the Catholic view of genetic engineering has evolved but has remained consistently supportive. In
fact, the Second Vatican Council (“Vatican II”) determined mastery over
nature was part of God’s will. 44 Rather than being deterred from building
up the world, man is compelled to do so. 45 The view of many who contributed to Vatican II is that man is a co-creator with God. 46 However, Vatican II did recognize limitations on man’s role as a creator, stating, “[A]ll
things are endowed with their own stability, truth, goodness, proper laws,
and order. Man must respect these as he isolates them by the appropriate
methods of the individual science or arts.” 47 This approach recognizes the
legitimacy of altering nature and the autonomy of science as long as the
creator is given proper reverence.
Pope John Paul II modified the approach taken by Vatican II, but did
not reject it. In his view, since the order of nature, though not fixed, had its
origin in God, man’s guide must be in harmony with the law of nature. 48
At the Jubilee of the Agricultural World, November 11, 2000, Pope John
Paul II noted the concerns of the scientific community about the sustainability of the present agricultural system. 49 Specifically addressing the geId. at 936.
Id. at 933.
See Kunich, supra note 5, at 812-13.
2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 932.
Genesis 1:28.
SHANNON, supra note 10, at 36.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 36.
Pope John Paul II, Address at Jubilee of the Agricultural World (Nov. 11, 2000), reprinted in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 111, 111–14.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
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netically engineered food, he expressed the need for the utmost care in the
assessment and valuation of the consequences of modification. 50 The Pope
cautioned, “[Biotechnologies] must be submitted beforehand to rigorous
scientific and ethical examination, to prevent them from becoming disastrous for human health and the future of the earth.” 51 Though the Catholic
position is rooted in natural law, there is no morally absolute objection to
genetic engineering based on that natural law. In the absence of a complete
prohibition, the focus becomes one of personal responsibility and stewardship to prevent exploitation and unintended consequences. 52
Though also cognizant of the biblical text, the Protestant approach is
slightly different. However, it too stops well short of a prohibition of genetic modification. Taking a more holistic approach, Protestants tend to
locate the debate within an ecological setting. 53 One view finds this difference possibly rooted in the Reformation, which emphasized sin and its destructive effects on humanity. 54 In contrast to the Catholic view, the Protestant position derives more from a concept of stewardship than one of
natural law. 55 For example, Methodists see God as the creator, man as his
stewards, and technology in service to both humanity and God. 56 Similarly, the Orthodox Church sees humanity as “both a given and a potential.” 57
Again, the emphasis is on the use and consequences of genetics rather than
prohibition based on any moral argument.
Although the issue is very complex under Jewish law and the doctrine
is still evolving—there is no outright objection to genetically modified
foods. 58 Judaism takes the view that God created the universe but left it in
an incomplete state. 59 God created Adam as a partner who is charged with
completing the creation by finding the cure for disease and producing
enough food for the hungry. 60 Technology should work toward the benefit
of humanity without violating divine rules. 61 This approach defers the determination of morality to the assessment of the consequences. The benefits must outweigh the risks, but if they do, genetically engineered foods
have a place in society.
Similar to the scriptural approach taken by other religions, Islam
adopts a worldview rooted in revelation. 62 Religious leaders conduct a
Id. at 112.
Id.
SHANNON, supra note 10, at 55.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
See Carl Feit, Genetically Modified Food and Jewish Law (Halakhah), in GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 123, 124.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 124.
62 Mohammad Fadel, Islam and the New Genetics, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 901, 901 (2001).
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

MINDRUP_213-242_JAM

220

2/20/2008 8:13 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 11:213

case-by-case analysis of emerging technologies based on four sources: the
Qur’an; God’s word as revealed to Mohammed; the sunna, the normative
practice of the Prophet Muhammad here on earth; and community standards. 63 If none of these is available, the leaders adopt a utilitarian approach. 64 In practice, the assessment of a new technology or situation depends on reason by analogy—a practice that seems similar to common law
jurisprudence in the United States and England. Under the Islamic approach, human intervention in nature is permissible so long as the purpose
for the intervention is for the benefit of human beings. 65 Man does not violate any prohibition against changing God’s creation if he promotes welfare by reducing need or treating a disease. 66 However, those leaders in the
Islamic community who are more conservative do favor complete prohibition. As evidence of the impropriety of tampering with nature, these leaders rely on the passage of the Qur’an which provides: “And He created everything, and determined [each thing] precisely.” 67 If God created each
thing precisely, man has no authority to tamper with God’s creation.
Another well-established principle in Muslim ethics may also have a practical effect on whether transgenic crops are morally acceptable. Muslims
believe that the removal of existing harm deserves greater precedence than
achieving new benefits. 68 Even if it is not always conceptually easy to distinguish the difference, this precept may suggest a different approach on a
case-by-case basis. 69 Although no general prohibition exists, Islamic ethics
may require a specific assessment of goals before adopting genetically
modified foods as the solution.
This brief examination of religious views on genetic engineering demonstrates the absence of a per se prohibition on genetic enhancement of
the world’s food supply based on religion. Moreover, the judiciary has also
foreclosed any personal religious objection by finding that the United
States’ regulatory scheme, which allows transgenic crops to be sold without
labeling, does not violate the free exercise of religion by persons who object to transgenic crops. 70 Absent any religious objection, the analysis of
the morality of transgenic crops largely lends itself to an assessment of the
risks and rewards. The focus becomes eliminating unintended consequences and assuring that the intended consequences are just. The analysis
is utilitarian in nature, deciding how to best use the technology for the benefit of humankind, rather than based in moral absolutes. As such, opponents have struggled to articulate an argument against genetically altered
crops based on morality.
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 901–02.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id. at 904 n.6 (quoting al-Furqan 25:2 (THE QUR’AN)).
Id. at 909–10.
Id. at 910.
See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179–80 (D.D.C. 2000).
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LOST OPPORTUNITY
This difficulty of articulating moral opposition to transgenic crops and
genetic engineers’ reaction to it represents a primary failing in the discussion regarding the exploration of biotechnology. Proponents did not find
anything intrinsically wrong from a theological point of view nor any wellframed argument against genetic engineering. As such, they assumed their
desired ends were just and forged ahead without engaging the community
in a meaningful dialogue that could have ameliorated many of the public’s
misgivings about biotechnology. Whether borne of arrogance, a drive for
profits, or a single-minded devotion to discovery, some scientists and agribusiness executives failed to understand that, for many people around the
world, there is still an ethical issue to balance with the laudable goal of
feeding the hungry.
Science is an institution that deserves great respect, but that respect results from the efforts of those visionaries who have explained to the public
how a scientific discovery could benefit humankind. In the laboratory, the
scientific method operates independently of social pressures, but to realize
its potential, science must interact with the outside world. Science has the
ability to create new technology, but the proper use of that technology is
often a matter of values. Science must inform traditional beliefs, but also
proceed with an understanding of the anxiety caused by the displacement of
existing values. Further complicating the issue, science is not fully operating in its normal fashion in the development of many transgenic plants.
Collegial competition and peer review yield to market competition, the
threat of negative publicity, and the jealous protection of patents. These
factors foster an atmosphere of secrecy that engenders societal skepticism.
EVOLVING OPPOSITION
Critics of transgenic crops also accuse proponents of portraying the
skeptical public as misinformed or uneducated. 71 For example, Leon Kass,
currently Chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics (the “Council”), suggests that scientists cast the issue as beneficial knowledge versus
ignorant and superstitious anxiety. 72 Given the larger issues involved, Kass
believes the public is right to be ambivalent about genetic engineering. 73
He believes people’s worries are in touch with the deepest matters of human dignity, and we ignore them at our peril. 74
Despite the expansion of transgenic crops and the difficulty of expressing moral opposition without a religious objection, opponents of
transgenic crops continue to press arguments for limiting genetic engineer71 Matthew Rich, Note, The Debate Over Genetically Modified Crops in the United States: Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 900–01 (2004).
72 LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR
BIOETHICS 120 (2002).
73 Id.
74 Id.
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ing itself. Groups opposed to genetically altered crops argue that the persistent resistance in Europe, the United States, and around the world demonstrates public resistance to genetically engineered food independent of
possible consequences. 75 Notwithstanding the acceptance of genetic engineering by the world’s organized religions, many opponents of biotechnology still build their arguments for prohibition or restraint on a basis of vague spirituality. A useful device in the debate about genetically altered
food has been to focus any discussion of morality on the genetic alteration
of humans and then project the public’s uncertainty or apprehension back
to genetic alteration in any form, including the alteration of plants. 76 The
idea is to gain support for categorical prohibition against any type of intervention in nature based on morality and driven by fear of chimeras or loss
of humanity. Though some objections to genetic alteration are real, such
arguments when made by interested groups appear to be designed to capitalize on the resurgence of piety and sanctimonious environmental activism
currently en vogue in American culture.
More constructively, ethicists struggle to find real limitations on
science and self-interest in an age when technology and the rate of advancement can quickly surpass our ability to understand the personal, social, and cultural implications of a new discovery. Representative of this
effort, the Council reflects the struggle between progress and the amorphous apprehension many people still hold about genetic engineering. The
Council sees biotechnology as a form of human empowerment, but the
techniques of the technology do not define its purposes. 77 Therefore, society’s focus must be on the abilities and goals of biotechnology, rather than
the process itself. 78 By adopting this view, the Council concedes the validity of genetic engineering and aligns itself with the position held by the
majority of the world’s religions. As such, the issue again becomes a matter of degree or balance rather than a complete prohibition.
The Council seems to suggest a limitation on genetic engineering
based on a vague religiosity and a form of natural law affected by modern
environmentalism. 79 Wary of “upsetting eons of gradual and exacting evolution,” the Council is concerned with the problem of hubris. 80 The Council also notes the precautionary principle and its conservative approach to
interventions into the natural world with some deference, but never actually
adopts the principle’s heavy burden on new technology. 81 Instead, the
75 Gregory E. Kaebnick, On Genetic Engineering and the Idea of the Sacred: A Secular Argument, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 863, 863–64 (2001).
76 Id.
77 See THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE
PURSUIT
OF
HAPPINESS
2
(2003),
available
at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/
beyondtherapy/beyond_therapy_final_webcorrected.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS].
78 Id. at 2–3.
79 Id. at 287.
80 Id.
81 See id. The precautionary principle is an environmental idea that posits, “[w]hen an activity
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken
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Council proposes that “[m]odesty born of gratitude for the world’s ‘givenness’ may enable us to recognize that not everything in the world is open to
any use we may desire or devise . . . .” 82 Noting man’s Promethean aspiration to remake nature to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires, the
Council states that this approach is erroneous because it risks unintended
consequences and reveals an improper disposition to the naturally given
world. 83 The Council’s observations are of little help in determining any
practical limitation on science and the role of the law or government in deciding or moderating complex moral issues. It is difficult to translate an
academic argument about the proper disposition toward nature into an understanding of what ought to be and how the law can effectuate that desired
result. Although the impact on the environment and the resulting effects on
humanity are central to the discussion of genetic engineering, the absence
of ethical directives about what ought to be done leaves us with limitations
designed to avoid unintended consequences. 84
The Council also observes that part of the trouble with genetic engineering is that the uncertainty of the goals that should ensure man’s interventions are not just representations of will or ends in themselves. 85 However, this potential criticism does not readily apply in the field of transgenic
crops. Putting any profit motive aside, everyone would agree that providing the means for the world’s population to feed itself is an admirable goal.
Accordingly, transgenic crops should be an easier issue on which to reach
consensus than genetic engineering of animals or humans. Focusing on the
specific issue of transgenic crops would elevate the debate about the prudence of genetic engineering. Scientists and the public could then work together to determine whether transgenic crops are proper tools to increase
food production and, if so, the ways in which society can acceptably use
these tools.
While the Council represents a view of genetic engineering that reflects a cautionary approach based in a vague, contemporary religiosity,
others have attempted secular explanations for a reluctance to tamper with
nature. Philosopher Gregory E. Kaebnick argues that terms like “Frankenfood,” a term commonly used by critics to describe genetically modified
plants, reveal that part of the public’s concern is with meddling per se. 86 In
addition to concern about unintended consequences, the terminology suggests concern about tampering with something intrinsically valuable to humanity. Kaebnick argues the apprehension about biotechnology is not relieven if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” Science and Environmental Health Network, Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, (1998),
http://www.sehn.org/state.html#w [hereinafter Wingspread Statement].
82 COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 77, at 289.
83 Id. at 287–89.
84 MICHAEL J. REISS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE?: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF
GENETIC ENGINEERING 63 (1996).
85 COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 77, at 289.
86 Kaebnick, supra note 75, at 864.
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gious, but instead is a secular version of the sacred. 87 Employing Ronald
Dworkin’s view of the sacred, Kaebnick notes: “[t]he most compelling example of a secular notion of the sacred is the widespread view that the environment ought to be treated with respect.” 88 Perhaps rooted in Henry
David Thoreau’s Walden, in which the author chronicled his life in the
woods, the modern environmental movement urges ethical limitations on
humanity’s interactions with the natural world. 89 Humanity’s exploitation
of the environment for its own ends at the expense of other species violates
something sacred. 90
Conceptually, it is easy to support the idea of man living harmoniously with nature. To an extent, humanity’s unique ability to alter the natural
order imposes a duty of stewardship. Most people agree it is in humanity’s
interest for nature to thrive in diversity. However, taken too far, this idea
of harmony denies the reality of limited resources and the brutality of nature itself. Throughout history, men and women have battled other men
and women as well as other species for the resources needed for survival.
The only remedy for this ongoing struggle is to increase the supply of resources, or to lower the demand for existing resources. Recognition of this
reality is essential to an informed debate about humankind’s relationship
with nature.
Furthermore, as we have seen, the difficulty with an appeal to the sacred is that it seems “vague, inarticulable, and emotional, particularly when
compared to the central concepts of Kantian or utilitarian thought.” 91 As
such, moral discussions of the sacred are difficult to criticize or defend. 92
This ambiguity makes it particularly difficult to engage in a productive discussion of limits, especially when proponents of biotechnology are entrepreneurs and intrepid scientists, both of whom deal in concrete, analytical
terms. Further, desire compels scientists and entrepreneurs to remove limitations even when they seem insurmountable. This compulsion is hardly
conducive to a dialogue with opponents espousing vague notions of the sacred, no matter how widely held.
In attempting to define a means by which we can argue about the sacred, Kaebnick roots the concept in the philosophical tradition based on
deeper values or virtues. 93 Traditionally, virtue ethics includes respect for
“thicker values” like kindness, honor, integrity, responsibility, loyalty, humility, and conscientiousness, as opposed to “thinner” values like autonomy and utility. 94 The sacred reincorporates moral beliefs about humanity’s
relationship with nature in contrast to popular notions of maximizing hap87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id. at 865.
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (1910).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 866.
Id.
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piness or eliminating deprivations of some feature of rationality that offer
little help with defining the proper relationship. 95 To this end, Kaebnick
suggests adopting a deontological counterpart to the consequentialist “cautionary principle,” which he describes as holding that a novel project or endeavor that realistically might cause harm to the environment or public
health may not be undertaken until there is reasonable evidence that harm
can be avoided. 96 In the same way, the sacred view treats the world with
restraint, shifting the burden of proof to those proposing a new type of intervention. 97 Any discussions of proposed interactions with nature must
begin with recognition of the value in leaving nature as it is regardless of
consequences. 98 An absolute ban is not necessary under a secular approach, but a reasoned public debate requires acknowledging deep-seated
convictions about our relationship with the natural world.
AGRIBUSINESS RESPONDS
Although moral objections are difficult to articulate, the corporations
developing transgenic crops have become more responsive to ethical concerns. Similar to the virtue ethics underpinning a secular notion of the sacred, some companies that develop transgenic seeds have adopted a stewardship model much like that espoused by several of the leading
religions. For example, DuPont, a leading manufacturer of transgenic
seeds, adopted guiding principles based on ensuring food safety, protecting
the environment, conserving biodiversity, and engaging stakeholders, as
well as working to improve food, nutrition and the quality of life. 99 Seed
companies like DuPont see themselves as respectful of the wishes of society and protecting the environment with caution and care while balancing
those interests with the need for increased productivity. Keeping in mind
the obvious influence of a well-compensated public relations department,
DuPont’s statement and similar pledges by others in the biotechnology industry, represents an attempt to re-engage the public in a discussion of difficult issues. While skepticism is reasonably appropriate, the shared language of stewardship and responsibility should serve as a starting point for
a dialogue about basic moral issues and the benefits and risks that are the
heart of debate over genetic engineering.
PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS AND THE RISK OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
In addition to the persistent, though amorphous, moral objection some
individuals have to transgenic crops, much of the public and many in the
scientific community share concerns about the risks posed by such crops
and whether the purported benefits outweigh the risks to health and the enId. at 871–72.
Id. at 872–73.
Id. at 872–73, 876.
Id. at 872–73.
DuPont, Bioethics Guiding Principles,
principles.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
95
96
97
98
99

http://www.dupont.com/biotech/difference/
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vironment. 100 Although the rhetoric frequently suggests absolute moral limitations, the details of the debate essentially boil down to scientific arguments or assessments of risk. 101 However, that reality does not eliminate a
values-based discussion of transgenic crops, but merely alters the form of
the discussion. Risk-based cost-benefit analysis inherently involves balancing different practical and ethical interests to reach a consensus that
enables action.
In the cost-benefit area, opponents of genetic engineering employ
scientific and socio-cultural arguments that are more tractable than those
made for prohibition of genetic engineering based on moral absolutes.
Though initially unprepared for the explosion of biotechnology in the
1990s, critics now express tangible concerns about safety and the environment that frequently resonate with the public. 102 As time has passed, opponents of transgenic crops have more information to support their arguments and an effective support network to publish their views.
EROSION OF THE MORAL HIGH GROUND
To start, opponents have tried to remove some of the moral high
ground from those who claim transgenic crops will be able to feed the
world. Acknowledging the dire state of nutrition in the world, opponents
argue that starvation is not a result of insufficient production, but is in fact
a distribution problem. 103 The United Nations World Food Program notes
that there is currently more than enough food produced, but the problem is
one of access. 104 Failures in the distribution system and political pressures
prevent adequate supplies of food from reaching those in need. In addition,
critics argue that many farmers cannot afford to grow modern crops and
consumers cannot afford to buy them—a fact not helped by increased corporate control over food resources. 105 Further, many opponents believe the
purported benefits of transgenic crops are not suited to ecological, smallscale agriculture practiced by the majority of farmers around the world. 106
The high costs of research and development prompted many researchers to
focus on seed varieties that would have the widest application worldwide. 107 Arguably, this broad approach has prevented many areas most in
need of increased production from benefiting from the technology.
100 Marc A. Saner, Real and Metaphorical Moral Limits in the Biotech Debate, 19 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 609 (July 2001), reprinted in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 78–
79.
101 Id. at 78.
102 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 15.
103 Id. at 18.
104 Charman, supra note 9, at 9.
105 Id.
106 VANDANA SHIVA, Genetic Engineering and Food Security in STOLEN HARVEST, (South End
Publisher 2000), reprinted in ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 24, at 130, 132.
107 Matthew Feldman, et al., Why So Much Controversy Over Genetically Modified Organisms?
Answers to 10 Frequently Asked Questions about GMOS, CIMMYT, Feb. 7, 2000, http://www.cimmyt.
org/abc/10-faqaboutgmos/htm/10-faqaboutgmos.htm
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The agribusiness corporations producing the majority of the modified
crops have amplified the fear of a monopoly over the world’s food supply
by aggressively protecting their research. Following Chakrabarty and related legislation, breakthroughs in genetic engineering are patentable as intellectual property. Owners of those patents vigorously protect their proprietary interests in significant ways. Contrary to typical farming practices,
farmers who purchase transgenic seeds cannot save and replant seeds. 108
This is a particular concern in developing countries where farmers have
reused seeds for centuries to try to improve yields. 109 Under a typical licensing agreement, farmers purchase seeds sold for a single season. 110 The
following planting season farmers must either re-license or purchase new
seeds. 111 Farmers accused of violating such agreements have found themselves defending lawsuits. 112 In fact, one of the leading manufacturers of
transgenic seeds, Monsanto, claims ownership for genes and plants containing its patented material regardless of where they are or how they got
there. 113 Further alarming farmers and many governments, Monsanto and
the United States government hold a patent on so-called “terminator technology” that makes seeds sterile and of no value beyond a single planting. 114 The dominant concern is that a few multinational corporations
could control the entire food supply. In response to a public outcry, there is
an international moratorium on use of the seeds, but recent efforts to test
the seeds in field trials have renewed concern about the technology. 115
While expressing legitimate concern, these arguments reveal that much of
the apprehension surrounding genetic engineering is less about science or
morality than it is about the economic influence of large multi-national
corporations.
The concentration of biotechnology and the potential for abuse is also
a central concern of religious leaders who approve of genetic engineering
in theory. The Catholic Church has expressed concern that excessive intellectual property rights to widely used crops could have a devastating impact on developing nations. 116 Pope John Paul II observed, “All too often,
the fruits of scientific progress, rather than being placed at the service of
the entire human community, are distributed in such a way that unjust inequalities are actually increased or even rendered permanent.” 117 Noting
Rich, supra note 71, at 898.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterborer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
Rich, supra note 71, at 912.
Stephen Leahy, Ban Endures on Terminator Seeds, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Feb.
11, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=27410
115 Id.
116 Archbishop Agostino Marchetto, Address to the Convention Organized by the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart on the Theme of “New Frontiers for Bioethics: The Biotechnologies” (Nov.
18, 2000), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/documents/rc_segst_doc_20001118_marchetto-univ-sacred-heart_en.html.
117 Pope John Paul II, Message of the Holy Father to the Group “Jubilee 2000 Debt Cam108
109
110
111
112
113
114
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the “social mortgage” on all private property, he counseled, “The law of
profit alone cannot be applied to that which is essential for the fight against
hunger, disease and poverty.” 118 Similarly, the World Council of Churches
stated that, “justice is denied if ‘biotechnology is used to increase the control of the rich nations and groups over the biological resources of creation
. . . .’” 119 Islam also focuses on distributive justice, noting that “benefits
should not be priced to exclude the poor and underprivileged from benefiting from the advances of science.” 120 Clearly, discussions of the proper allocation of the benefits of transgenic crops should be a part of the public
debate, but the risk of exploitation does not necessitate a prohibition on genetic engineering.
Unfortunately, even if all the questions about distribution are satisfactorily answered, the disagreement about the safety of genetically modified
foods has undermined the ability for transgenic crops to help end world
hunger. Resistance to transgenic crops in Europe has spread to some of
those who stand to benefit the most from the promises of new biotechnology. To the dismay of biotechnology supporters, several countries in dire
need of food have refused donations that contained genetically altered
grain. 121 In August of 2002, the African nations of Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, and Malawi rejected U.S. corn from the United Nations Food
Programme, citing fear of health risks or the loss of European markets for
their own products. 122 Whether economically or socially based, the criticisms of biotechnology and the companies that own the patents have dramatically slowed the pace of implementation around the world.
EVALUATING REAL RISK TO HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In addition to questioning the purported benefits, opponents also express genuine concern for potential risks to individual health and the environment. Critics contend that proper risk assessment requires more than
we know. 123 In contrast to traditional breeding, which enabled breeders to
observe any untoward effects developed over time, rapid changes facilitated by genetic engineering could create wide-scale unintended consequences. 124 Most of the concerns focus on two areas: food safety and the
effect on the environment. 125 Opponents of transgenic crops express concern about both the means and the ends of genetic engineering. For example, many see the introduction of genetically altered products into the food
paign,”(Sept. 23, 1999), available at , http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1999/
september/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_23091999_jubilee-2000-debt-campaign_en.html.
118 Id.
119 SHANNON, supra note 10, at 65 (citations omitted).
120 Fadel, supra note 62, at 909 (citations omitted).
121 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 17–18.
122 Id. at 17–18.
123 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 22, at 933.
124 Id.
125 David Magnus & Arthur Caplan, Food for Thought: The Primacy of the Moral in the GMO
Debate, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS supra note 31, at 80, 81.
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supply as an experiment on unwilling subjects without following the scientific method. 126 Critics contend that testing has been inadequate at every
stage of the process. Moreover, scientists are splicing genes into food
products from species that do not interbreed in nature and often have no
history of food use. 127 One of the primary health concerns is that allergens
unknown to consumers could pose risk of illness or death. For example,
one variety of soybeans genetically altered with a protein from a Brazil nut
had to be abandoned after millions of dollars of development when researchers discovered people who were allergic to Brazil nuts were also allergic to soybeans with the spliced protein. 128
Proponents counter that there is a consensus in the scientific community that there is nothing inherently unsafe about splicing genes from one
organism to another and that any disagreement about the process concerns
specific classes and uses. 129 They reiterate that safety depends on the
food’s properties and have nothing to do with the process by which it is
produced. 130 Even though transgenic crops receive more testing than any
other food item, critics argue that transgenic crops receive no extensive laboratory testing, leaving the effects of long-term exposure to transgenic
crops largely unknown. 131 The difficulty with this long-term exposure argument is that the same can be said for almost any scientific advancement
relating to human beings, including everything from inoculations to electricity. While uncertainty suggests caution, it certainly does not justify paralysis.
A second area of concern is the potential impact of genetically altered
plants on the environment. Some scientists note the dangers of releasing
new organisms into existing ecosystems. 132 In particular, concern centers
on the difficulty of estimating the effects of genetic drift from modified
plants to native populations, which could threaten the environment. Such
drift could reduce biodiversity as genetically enhanced plants take over and
push out natural competitors. 133 The threat of genetic drift is not only theoretical, as gene flow may already be occurring. Many in the scientific
community were alarmed when genetically modified corn contaminated the
national treasury of corn at Capulalpan, Mexico, despite the Mexican government’s prohibition on genetically modified corn—a program specifically designed to protect the native gene pool.134 This type of unintended drift
KATHLEEN HART, EATING IN THE DARK 4–8 (2002).
Mae-Wan Ho, The Unholy Alliance, 27 THE ECOLOGIST 152 (July-Aug. 1997), reprinted in
ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 24, at 80, 84. See, e.g., HART, supra note 126, at 33 (listing genes with no
history of food use being inserted into food products).
128 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 15; see also OSU GMO FAQ, supra note 34.
129 OSU GMO FAQ, supra note 34.
130 Id.
131 Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 417 & n.84 (2002).
132 Rich, supra note 71, at 895–97.
133 Id. at 895–96.
134 Id. at 896–97.
126
127
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could lead to a loss of biodiversity and a tendency toward uniformity that
makes crops more vulnerable to pests and pathogens that will co-evolve. 135
Moreover, there is a risk that the genes could pass to wild relatives,
creating what critics describe as “superweeds.” 136 Wild plants that acquire
genes that make them more resistant to herbicides would require stronger
herbicides that in turn could do more damage to the environment or endanger natural plants and animals that depend on those plants for food. Similarly, scientists are concerned about resistance to pesticides. Corn with a
gene from the bacterium Bacillus thuringensis (Bt) that is toxic to many insects is one of the most widely planted transgenic crops. 137 Critics worry
that as insects build immunities to Bt toxins, new pesticides may have to be
developed. 138 In addition, the loss of Bt as a pesticide would be devastating
to organic farming, which relies heavily on the natural pesticide. 139
Proponents admit that science does not yet know all of the effects of
biotechnology. Nevertheless, they suggest the risks are unlikely to materialize and that users can substantially reduce the risks by proper measures,
such as planting refuges around fields of transgenic crops to sustain populations of insects susceptible to the toxins. 140 Proponents also argue that
transgenic crops have a less drastic effect on the environment than existing
means. 141 Even though many opponents of genetic engineering attempt to
paint a picture of transgenic crops forced on the small, family farmer who
wishes only to grow a few vegetables for sale at the local market, the reality is that industrial farms using large amounts of chemicals grow the majority of the world’s food. 142 Any change caused by genetic engineering must
be seen in this context and not compared to an idyllic view of the American
farmer that may have never existed, and certainly would not be able to respond to the expanding agricultural needs of the world today.
Opponents of transgenic crops agree that appropriate precautionary
means can reduce the risks to health and the environment. 143 Correspondingly, proponents of genetically altered crops concede that the potential
risks associated with some technologies outweigh the benefits. 144 One nat135 MARC LAPPE & BRITT BAILEY, AGAINST THE GRAIN: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CORPORATE
TAKEOVER OF YOUR FOOD (Common Courage Press 1998), reprinted in ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note
23, at 156, 158–63.
136 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 14; Rich, supra note 71, at 895.
137 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 14.
138 Rich, supra note 71, at 895.
139 CHARLES M. BENBROOK ET AL., PEST MANAGEMENT AT THE CROSSROADS 221 (1996);
YOUNT, supra note 11, at 14.
140 OSU GMO FAQ, supra note 34.
141 See id.
142 See WENDELL BERRY, The Unsettling of America, in THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE
AND AGRICULTURE (1977), reprinted in ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 24, at 5, 17–25; Skip Spitzer, Industrial Agriculture and Corporate Power, GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER Aug. 2003, at 1.
143 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 38 (2004) (discussing the
process of bioconfinement as a method of reducing the dangers of transgenic crops) ; OSU GMO FAQ,
supra note 32 (discussing the requirements of plant refuges to sustain nearby insect populations).
144 Magnus & Caplan, supra note 125, at 83.
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ural philosophical framework for assessing the appropriate choices and
means is utilitarianism. Under this view, stakeholders must weigh the risks
and benefits and determine which outcome maximizes utility as measured
by the net benefit to society. 145 As demonstrated by the abandonment of
the soybean with the Brazil nut gene, some products may be too dangerous
to develop in relation to the anticipated benefit while others are worthwhile. Conceptually, a utilitarian view seems appropriate, but as applied, it
proves very difficult given the range of values worldwide.
RATIONAL RISK POLICY: ALLOCATING COSTS AND BENEFITS
One issue that inevitably arises is who will bear the costs and who will
reap the benefits. 146 This issue has particular poignancy with respect to
transgenic crops because private corporations in large industrialized countries primarily own the technology, whereas the targets are often the poorest countries of the third world. 147 Moreover, the public is wary of the
technology and assumes that the risks it perceives are motivated by the
profit margins of privately held corporations. Potential evidence of a
skewed utility analysis is that most of the first generation crops appear to
be suited to wide distribution and corporate profit motives, such as selling
herbicides in conjunction with the seeds, rather than improving yields in
difficult third world climates or improving nutrition or taste for consumers.
VARIATIONS IN RISK TOLERANCE
Another disabling feature is that individuals have vastly different levels of tolerance for risk depending on their situation. Rational people frequently disagree about how much risk is acceptable given possible outcomes—witness the stock market, the insurance industry, and Las Vegas.
Different people look at the same information and reach different conclusions. For example, Judge Richard A. Posner argues that proponents of
transgenic crops, like Indur Goklany, underestimate the danger that the
process might get out of hand and that a genetically modified plant or animal will out-compete and destroy native species. 148 In contrast, Goklany
looks at the same evidence and believes the benefits clearly outweigh the
costs. 149 Goklany argues that opponents of genetically modified crops ignore the potential downside of not using the technology because they deem
the crops too risky. 150 He observes that “[f]ew actions are either unmitigated disasters or generate unadulterated benefits.” 151 Therefore, in a situa145
146

Id.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 124–25

(2002).
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 299.
POSNER, supra note 143, at 38–39 (2004).
Id.; INDUR M. GOKLANY, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF AM. BUS. POLICY STUDY 157: APPLYING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS, (Aug. 2000), reprinted in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 265, 266.
150 Id. at 265.
151 Id. at 266.
147
148
149
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tion in which the outcome is ambiguous because both the costs and benefits
are uncertain, you must compare all of the consequences and then determine which action is preferable. 152 In certain situations, inaction could be
the riskier behavior. 153 This analysis demonstrates the difficulty in deciding whether adopting transgenic crops or banning them entails more risk,
especially given the degree of uncertainty and people’s varying levels of
tolerance for risk. Frequently, people are quick to assert their view as the
correct one, but it is difficult to find “right” answers to matters so affected
by personal values. The number of variables and the lack of good information on which to base effective risk assessments demonstrate the need for a
sustained public dialogue on this issue rather than sensationalist headlines
and visceral reactions.
FLAWED RISK ANALYSIS
The frequency with which risk decisions are flawed further complicates any assessment of risk. Research demonstrates that individuals overestimate the small risks they face and underestimate the more substantial
ones. 154 Moreover, when assessing risks, individuals tend to pay a great
deal of attention to risks perceived as new or novel, but very little to those
to which they have become accustomed. 155 For example, a new food additive is more likely to get attention than risks posed by improper diet and
lack of exercise. 156 There is even dissonance within the food context.
Many people reluctant to accept foods developed by what they see as an
unnatural process have no problem eating foods with labels full of artificial
ingredients and preservatives. This tendency to be overly attentive to novel
risks could cause the public to overestimate small risks associated with
emerging biotechnologies, prompting consumers to make inefficient decisions.
Furthermore, modes of thinking and mental shortcuts that facilitate
normal decision-making are often ineffective or even problematic in the
risk context. 157 Without cognitive shortcuts, individuals could not function
when confronted by the astronomical number of choices modern society
presents. However, the shortcuts necessitated by everyday life are frequently inadequate for rational risk assessment. Risk ambiguity in a situation can generate irrational responses. 158 In fact, three common fallacies
apply with considerable force to the issue of transgenic crops. These fallacies affect decision making about risk and associated cost-benefit analysis
regarding potential environmental and health risks. 159 First, people tend to
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 266.
W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 6 (1998).
Id. at 17.
Id.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 84.
VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 18.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 36.
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believe that “risk is an all or nothing” proposition. 160 An activity or product must be either dangerous or safe. Second, people are generally “committed to a belief in the benevolence of nature,” so people always see human activities as being more dangerous than natural ones. 161 This belief in
the benevolence of nature could cause opposition to transgenic crops without understanding the harsh effects nature often has on agriculture in many
parts of the world. For some, a proper reverence for nature unrealistically
forecloses tampering with nature in any way. Finally, many people have a
“zero-risk” mentality. 162 Undoubtedly due in part to the significant scientific advancements in the twentieth century, the public believes it is possible to remove all, or nearly all, of the risk from an activity. 163 This belief
creates unrealistic expectations and acts as a bar to potentially beneficial
products such as transgenic crops. For a technology to satisfy such a low
level of acceptable risk, any benefit must be unrealistically large to counterbalance even the smallest risk of harm. Such standards could deny society considerable benefits without an understanding of the corresponding
costs.
COMPOUNDED DIFFICULTY
The divergence of expert scientific opinion regarding the safety of
transgenic crops compounds the difficulties the public has assessing risk.
When there are divergences in judgment regarding the degree of risk,
people tend to place a greater weight on the worst-case scenario. 164 Substantial disagreement in the scientific community is likely to cause not only
confusion but also alarmist responses. 165 The strong resistance to transgenic crops in Europe and the growing resistance in the United States, despite
any evidence of an adverse health effect, arguably demonstrate such a response. Adding to the difficulty of accurately assessing risk, “selfinterested private groups are entirely willing to exploit the underlying
forces” to promote a particular point of view. 166 For example, the manufacturers of transgenic crops exploit concerns about population growth and
public compassion for the world’s hungry for financial gain under a thin
auspice of altruism. 167 Similarly, “European companies have tried to play
up fears of genetically engineered food as a way of fending off competition
from American farmers.” 168 Politicians and environmental groups have also exploited uncertainty about genetic engineering to promote their own
interests. 169
160
161
162
163
164
165
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167
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169
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Id.
Id.
Id.
VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 21.
Id.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 91
See SHIVA, supra note 106, at 131.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 92.
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Instead of improving the assessment process, political and social
forces exacerbate the cognitive limitations confronting risk assessments.
As discussed above, opponents tend to minimize or even ignore risks presented by alternatives to biotechnology. Often risk analysis requires assessment of risk-risk tradeoffs. 170 There may be competing risks arising
from an alternative policy or behavioral responses to it, but activists tend to
downplay or ignore the alternative risks. 171 For example, if genetically
modified crops allow better yields under lower tillage, the preservation of
natural habitat may present a net benefit in biodiversity and environmental
protection. Similarly, if transgenic crops in fact require fewer herbicides,
the environment may benefit overall as compared to conventional practices.
On the other hand, if proponents are unable to convince the intended beneficiaries of relief that transgenic crops represent a safe alternative, as was
the case with the rejected food relief in Africa in 2002, 172 the purported
benefit does not materialize and may not justify the risk. In contrast to the
currently polarized positions in the debate over transgenic crops, effective
risk analysis will require a collaborative effort to overcome the problems
people have assessing risk.
If people do not have accurate risk perceptions, providing information
can remedy the market failure. 173 Information can play an important role in
fostering better risk decisions. 174 The disagreement about the risks associated with transgenic crops and the cognitive limitations affecting the assessment of those risks suggest both the importance and the difficulty of
designing an appropriate regulatory regime. Effective risk analysis is both
necessary for regulation and potentially aided or impeded by it. Information
generated by the regulatory process can assist individuals in making individual risk assessments. In the nature of a feedback loop, the public discourse, which includes actions by government agencies, shapes individual
risk judgments that then feed back into the public discourse.175 In this way,
the risk assessment process compounds the effect of inaccurate information. As such, only a system that provides accurate information to the public can foster an environment in which the public can reach a consensus on
the difficult issue of genetic engineering.
REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC CROPS
Opponents of the current regulatory framework for transgenic crops in
the United States criticize it as too deferential to business interests. 176 The
CONFLICT IN FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY 68–70 (2003).
170 VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 169–70.
171 Id.
172 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 17–18.
173 VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 26.
174 Id. at 43.
175 SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 92–93.
176 E.g., Kurt Eichenwald et. al, Biotechnology Food: From the Lab to a Debacle, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2001, reprinted in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 31–40.
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process by which the government implemented the current regulatory system fostered these criticisms and resulted in another failure of proponents
of transgenic crops to effectively engage the public. In an atypical move,
executives from Monsanto met with Vice President George Bush at the
White House in 1986 and requested regulation of genetically altered food
designed to reassure the public that the underlying science was safe. 177 Rather than engage the public in a rational dialogue about the risks and benefits of genetic engineering to ensure public acceptance, Monsanto purportedly adopted a strategy of manipulating market perceptions. Initially, the
biotechnology industry traded political capital to get favored regulations,
while gradually trying to win support from the public and environmental
groups. 178 In time, however, Monsanto’s strategy changed to one designed
to erase regulatory barriers and ignore the complaints of critics on the way
to rushing the new technology to market. 179 The strategy and resulting
regulatory scheme galvanized opposition and undermined any meaningful
debate. 180
The regulatory framework for transgenic crops involves the coordination of three federal agencies. 181 The Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) is responsible for regulating genetically modified food and
feeds. 182 The United States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) regulates importation
and interstate movement of genetically modified crops, as well as oversees
the introduction of transgenic crops into the environment. 183 Finally, the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is responsible for regulating
plants that produce pesticides. 184
Opponents of transgenic crops have been the most critical of the
FDA’s policies. The thrust of the FDA’s regulatory approach is to assess
the risk posed by the product itself without regard to the process by which
it was developed. 185 Oversight is only appropriate when the risk is unreasonable and when the benefits of oversight are greater than the related
costs. 186 Under the provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FFDCA”), the FDA is responsible for regulating new foods and food additives. 187 The FFDCA gives the agency the power to regulate food labeId. at 31–32.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33, 39.
Id. at 33.
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Announcement of Policy; Notice for
Public Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,304 (June 26, 1986).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties; 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29,
1992) [hereinafter Statement of Policy].
186 Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food
and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 741 (2003).
187 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2000).
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180
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ling and approve all food additives. 188 New substances added to foods
must get approval in advance unless the FDA determines the substance is
“generally recognized as safe” (“GRAS”). 189 In 1992, the FDA announced
a narrow view of its regulatory role with regard to genetically altered plants
in its “Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties”
(“Statement of Policy”). 190 The FDA decided to apply existing regulations
rather than generate new regulations for genetically modified varieties. 191
In its Statement of Policy, the FDA announced that genetically modified
crops are the “substantial equivalent” of crops developed through conventional breeding. 192 As such, crops produced by the process of gene splicing
are GRAS and therefore not subject to regulation as a food additive. 193
Based on this determination, the FDA completes no pre-market review of
the products and requires no special labeling. 194 Moreover, the producer
rather than the FDA makes the determination as to whether a product qualifies as GRAS. 195 However, even without pre-market regulation, producers
face strong incentives to market safe products, including the threat of FDA
seizure, bad publicity, tort liability, and even criminal liability. 196
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Despite the apparent inconsistency presented by allowing a patent for
a product that qualifies as a “distinct and new variety” 197 of plant and the
determination that the plant is the “substantial equivalent” 198 to existing varieties and therefore not subject to approval or labeling, the FDA’s position
has been vindicated by the courts. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 199 a coalition of opponents of genetic engineering contested the FDA’s
policy on genetically modified foods on several grounds. 200 The District
Court for the District of Columbia determined the FDA did not violate various procedural requirements when it developed its policy on transgenic
crops. 201 The court rejected the substantive challenges to the agency’s policy and deferred to the FDA’s presumption that transgenic crops are
GRAS. 202 The court was also deferential to the FDA’s position that no
“material change” had occurred in the foods in question, obviating any
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000).
See Statement of Policy, supra note 185.
Id. at 22,984.
Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons From the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 593, 607 (2003).
193 See Statement of Policy, supra note 185, at 22,990.
194 Bratspies, supra note 192, at 607.
195 Id. at 609.
196 Id.
197 PlantPatent.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.plantplanet.com/faq.html#faq006
(last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
198 Bratspies, supra note 192, at 607.
199 116 F. Supp.2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000).
200 Id. at 166, 170.
201 Id. at 173.
202 Id. at 178.
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189
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need for the agency to impose a labeling requirement. 203 In fact, the court
noted the FDA’s limited power to consider consumer demand when making labeling decisions. 204 The decision made it clear that a legal challenge
would not be a very productive means of changing regulatory policy regarding transgenic crops. However, the discovery process did uncover
some disagreement among scientists at the FDA regarding the agency’s
policy, which critics have used to cast further doubt on the wisdom of, and
motivation for, the FDA’s policy on risk assessment. 205 The trial also
heightened public awareness of biotechnology and fueled the perception
that the government was not sufficiently overseeing the development and
marketing of transgenic products. 206
COST-BENEFIT REGULATION
Though criticized as overly deferential to the interests of the biotechnology industry, 207 the current regulatory scheme is consistent with the
trend toward cost-benefit regulation. Under the cost-benefit approach, an
agency assesses the magnitude of a problem, attempts to assess tradeoffs,
and uses effective and inexpensive tools to promote desired outcomes. 208
Proponents of this method argue that it is necessary, given the limited resources available. 209 Furthermore, proponents suggest the goal is not to let
companies save money or to scale back regulation, but to ensure that regulation is undertaken with a firm sense of its consequences. 210
The cost-benefit approach to regulation recognizes that the overestimation of highly publicized risks creates pressure on governmental behavior, especially when risks are novel and generate an exaggerated public
response. 211 As a result of strategic errors early on, the response to genetic
alteration of food represents just such a reaction, resulting in many groups
calling for a total ban. 212 However, every regulation entails opportunity
costs, and well-intentioned but ineffective risk regulations should not be
viewed as morally or ethically superior. 213 Regulation can lead to two
types of errors: 1) rejecting something that is safe and effective or 2) approving something that is not safe and effective. 214 Due to the cognitive
difficulties people have assessing risk, current regulatory policies often
Id. at 178–79.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 177 & n.7. See also Alliance for Bio-Integrity, http://www.biointegrity.org (last visited
Oct. 29, 2007).
206 Marden, supra 186, at 756.
207 Genetically Engineered Food, Center for Food Safety, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/
geneticall7.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
208 SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 4–5.
209 See id. at 6.
210 Id.
211 VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 24–25.
212 See, e.g., Genetically Modified Foods & Islam, http://www.muzammal.clara.net (last visited
Oct. 29, 2007).
213 VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 128.
214 Id. at 85.
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place excessive weight on the second type of error. 215 The public is much
more sensitive to errors of commission, which involve identifiable victims,
than to errors of omission, where the loss of life or harm is statistical. 216
This tendency causes the public to favor overly-cautious regulation. For
example, many opponents of transgenic crops favor adopting the precautionary principle, which posits, “When an activity raises threats of harm to
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken
even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” 217 This idea shifts the scientific burden of proof to those proposing a new activity.
While proponents of cost-benefit regulation acknowledge some truth
in the precautionary principle, they believe the concept goes too far. For
example, Cass Sunstein states, “Taken literally, the precautionary principle
would lead to indefensibly huge expenditures, exhausting our budget well
before the menu of options could be thoroughly consulted.” 218 Public interest groups and politicians tend to foster the view that the public can have
it all. To serve their own interests, these groups tend to exploit the public’s
tendency to overreact to visible victims and to require undue caution in
hindsight. For example, one person harmed by a revolutionary drug on the
evening news, has every public official clamoring to place blame for allowing the product to reach the public. 219 However, at the same time, those
same politicians and the public bemoan regulatory processes that prevent
drugs imported from other countries due to concerns about safety. 220
LABELING AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Despite the judicial affirmation of the FDA’s decision not to require
mandatory labeling of transgenic foods, labeling continues to be one of the
primary focuses of the debate. In contrast to the nebulous moral arguments
in opposition to genetic alteration itself, arguments for labeling find support
in other areas of the law. Advocates of labeling point out that consumer
demand for labeling of genetically altered food remains consistently high.
In 1999, a Time magazine poll found 81% of those polled wanted genetically engineered foods labeled, while the FDA received 50,000 written comments largely supportive of labeling. 221 In particular, the concerns about
labeling include a desire to safeguard food, prevent allergic reactions, and
Id.
Id. at 85–86.
Wingspread Statement, supra note 81.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 103.
See, e.g., Merck Announces Global Withdrawal of Vioxx After Study Shows Risks, LIFE
EXTENSION, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.lef.org/news/LefDailyNews.htm?NewsID=1126&section=
DISEASE.
220 See, e.g., Marv Shepherd, Drug Importation and Safety from Drugs Obtained from Canada,
ANNALS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, June 19, 2007 http://www.theannals.com/cgi/content/abstract/41/7/1288
(last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
221 Marden, supra note 186, at 760–61.
215
216
217
218
219

MINDRUP_213-242_JAM

2007]

Moral Uncertainty and Rational Risk Policy

2/20/2008 8:13 AM

239

avoid interference with moral or religious practice. 222 Consumer groups
argue that without a label, consumers are unable to choose what they eat
and cannot make informed decisions in the marketplace. 223
Furthermore, advocates of labeling note that, absent a label, people do
not know they are placing themselves at risk, which is the opposite of the
way agencies handle drugs and medical devices. 224 The difference in handling also suggests the public’s expectations about what government agencies are doing to ensure the safety of transgenic food is greater than what
regulators are actually doing. This criticism about the public’s right to
know proceeds from the idea of autonomy and finds traction in many of the
same arguments that support informed consent. Autonomy proceeds from
the assumption that a competent adult should be able to make her own decisions about what she wants to do with her own body. Since customers
lack valuable information, they are unable to make intelligent choices about
the foods they buy and the risks they assume.
In response, proponents of transgenic crops and the FDA maintain
there is no difference between transgenic foods and those produced by traditional processes, thus labels are unnecessary. 225 Supporters further note
that there is no evidence of adverse health effects associated with transgenic crops. 226 This lack of evidence causes supporters to question what information there is a duty to disclose. In addition, like informed consent, a
question arises as to the standard that should determine what information
the individual would want to know. It would be unrealistic to provide consumers with all the information available about all the components of each
individual product, especially given the physical limitations of labeling. As
such, a labeling program would be very limited in the meaningful information it provides consumers about safety and nutrition.
Moreover, consumers may perceive mandatory labeling as a negative
signal or voluntary labeling as implying superiority. 227 Scientists and the
food industry worry that a label would stigmatize transgenic crops, despite
scientific evidence of their safety. Finally, critics of labeling note that excessive labeling can be counterproductive by providing unnecessary information. 228 Any information strategy is subject to the same cognitive limitations the public has making risk assessments, including that the costs may
outweigh the benefit. 229 Paradoxically, too much labeling presents a seId. at 761.
Colin A. Carter & Guillaume P. Gruere, 6 AGBIOFORUM 43, 43 (2003), available at
http://www.agbioforum.org/v6n12/v6n12a13-carter.pdf.
224 Sara Butcher, Fraud-on-the-FDA and Genetically Modified Foods: Will the Action Stand?, 22
REV. LITIG. 669, 704 (2003).
225 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 261.
226 Emily Robertson, Finding a Compromise in the Debate Over Genetically Modified Food: An
Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-to-Know Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 156, 169 (2003).
227 See Rich, supra note 71, at 908.
228 SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 260–61.
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rious risk of information overload, depriving consumers of any realistic opportunity to get valuable information about the products they consume.
COMPROMISE AND COMMON GROUND
Despite these potential difficulties, regulators have responded to public pressure for labels. Adopting a strong individual rights approach, Congress has twice attempted to pass the Genetically Engineered Food Rightto-Know Act, which would have created a labeling scheme independent of
the FDA’s determination. 230 Neither bill passed, but the growing pressure
prompted the FDA to publish “Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary
Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed
Using Bioengineering.” 231 While maintaining its position that transgenic
crops are safe, the FDA acknowledged that the diverging views on transgenic crops supported allowing manufacturers to voluntarily include some
information regarding the development process as long as it was “truthful
and not misleading.” 232
Although there are still objections on both sides of the issue, voluntary
labeling appears to offer a reasonable compromise. As we have seen, some
effective labeling would help counteract the cognitive difficulty consumers
have assessing risks. In this way, the law merely assists economic actors in
forming a well-informed contract. If people do not have accurate risk perceptions, their interactions will be inefficient. Some form of labeling takes
advantage of the understanding that a well-designed information effort can
play a constructive role in sounder risk decisions. 233 Moreover, regulation
designed to provide information to the market can remedy the risk that
dangerous products that are cheaper to produce will drive safer products
out of the market when the consumer lacks pertinent information. 234 To be
effective, labeling should be only one part of an overall information campaign to improve public understanding of transgenic crops and raise the
level of the debate. Only accurate information can restore a reasoned discussion of the legitimate benefits and risks of transgenic crops.
CONCLUSION
As with most bioethical issues, it is unlikely that any single solution
could satisfy all of the interested parties in the debate over genetically engineered foods. The failure of proponents of transgenic crops to effectively
engage the public early in the process has polarized opinions on the issue
and forestalled any meaningful discussion. Upon closer examination, how230 Robertson, supra note 226, at 170–71 (citing H.R. 3377, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2080 106th
Cong. (2000)).
231 Marden, supra note 186, at 761.
232 Id.
233 VISCUSI supra note 154, at 45.
234 SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 255. Despite advocating for information generally, Sunstein opposes labeling of genetically altered foods because he believes the risks of confusion outweigh any benefit. Id. at 260–61.

MINDRUP_213-242_JAM

2007]

Moral Uncertainty and Rational Risk Policy

2/20/2008 8:13 AM

241

ever, it is clear that transgenic foods still represent an opportunity to open a
dialogue that will help facilitate a consensus on this issue. Once open, that
dialogue can help create a framework for deciding the more difficult genetic engineering issues on the horizon. The importance of food has the public engaged, and the lack of any religious objection to transgenic crops removes some of the passion that can cloud the discussion of bioethical
issues. Without any significant fracture between the religious and the political, discussions of the propriety of transgenic crops should involve less
tension than other biotechnology issues. In addition, the clear goals of
transgenic crops provide a sound base on which to discuss the risks and
benefits of transgenic crops.
Accurate information is central to an effective dialogue about transgenic crops. A regulatory environment focused on allowing the voluntary
exchange of information lets those who want to share information do so,
while facilitating an atmosphere of education that will enable the public to
work toward a consensus on very difficult issues. The law is not particularly good at creating consensus, but instead works best when it allows for
choice within limits and leaves a place for personal morality. A comprehensive information campaign can help do that. The free exchange of information and an educated dialogue also minimize the cognitive limitations
that lead to irrational behavior.
Political leaders in the United States and around the world must take a
more active role in promoting a productive dialogue about genetic engineering. In addition to voluntary labeling, the federal government should
create an informational infrastructure to facilitate the exchange of information between manufacturers and the public. Government agencies, manufacturers, and opponents already provide a considerable amount of information on the Internet, but there is no single place a consumer can go to get
information and compare the arguments. Part of an effective regulatory
scheme should include an information clearinghouse for the most current
information on biotechnology. With a better understanding of the real risks
and benefits associated with genetic engineering, an engaged and educated
public can work with the scientific community to determine what technologies are appropriate and how they can best be used to reach shared goals of
meeting the agricultural needs of a growing population.

